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Introduction

There is a widespread public belief that unions are the most
significant factor causing price increase.

It is explained by the

fact that unions always ask for higher wages with the result that
increasing the cost of production pushes uo prices.
The traditional wage theory explains wage increases by means
of the free forces of the market.

folages depend on the market supply

and demand for labor when market is in full em9loyment.

Unemployraent

is either frictional, or it arises from rigid money wage.
.

According to A.w. Phillips who was influenced by the traditional

wage theory, the rate of change of money wages is explained by
the level of unemployment at the macro level.

The rate of change

of wages is approximately proportiona� to the excess demand for labor.
The purpose or this paper is to study the factors affecting
wage change in one industry: the first part of this paper is devoted
to the explanation and analysis of tha history of unionism and collec
tive bargaining in the steel industry.

The second part sets up a model

for wage changes in the same industry.

The model depends on three

variables:

wage behavior,

market structure, and government intervention.

It is hard to show how much one factor, apart from, and perhaps in
opposition to other factors, may affeo t the wage changes.

In recent

years, the government has increased _its intervention in the disputes
of the steel industry, for steel has strategic �portance as a basic
component in defense mechanism.

ii

The model will be tested empirically in an attempt to corrollate
these factors, using multiple regression analysis, in order to learn
what the most significant factor is in the steel industry.
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Introduction to the First Part
In this part of the pap9r I shall try to study the development
of the union of Steelworkers in America, and its structure, or the
pattern of collective bargaining throughout the years.
This paper begins with a national labor movement, the Knights
of Labor, then the creation of the Amalgamated Association of Iron and
Steelworkers.

This includes the years from 1876 to 1910 and shall

examine the characteristics of this period.
Next, the period of 1910-1930 and the new governmental approach
toward labor--to guarantee the working man his right to organize.
In doing this, the government attempted to gain the �orkers'

support.

Thirdly, the period between 1930 and 19L1-5 was when the government
took a step to legislate the L.3.bor Act to guarantee the workers the
right to organize.

Also, during this era, the c.r.o.

took the

initiative to completely reorganize the steelworkers.
Then, the fourth period is between 1945 and 1959, when the
bargaining structure of the Union actually developed and took the
shape of nation-wide bargainin8.
Finally, the fifth period was from 1960 to 1965.

This period

is characterized.by more governmental intervention to prevent nationwide strikes in the steel industry and to work for more peaceful settlements.

2
Knights of Labor
The labor movement has a long history in the United States.
:Laborers had organized into unions to prevent unfair treatment by the
employers, suoh as: wage reduction; working hours; conditions of work;
and so forth.

The new frontier of labor activity, however, was the

establishment of a lobr federation, and on December 28, 1869, tho Knights
of Labor was founded.

Mr. Uriah S. Stephens was elected Master workman,

the highest office in the order.

1

Mr. Stephens, born in 1821 and educated

for the Baptist ministry, later became apprenticed to a tailor.
During his career Mr. Stephens also taught school and traveled extensively
in Central and South America.

Mr.· Stephens draw from his religious

baokground the vision of the universality of labor which was symbolized
in the mysticism of the Knights of Labor's secret ritual.2

.

Ho had

great respect for industry and he was opposed to boycotts and/or strikes
whose benefits he felt were "partial and evanescent.11
The Knights of Labor formed various district assemblies in order
to attain the ultimate goal of labor unity.

As time passed, many local

assemblies were established, mixed assemblies composed of workers from
different trades.

Then the Steelworkers joined the Knights.

The first

general convention was held in Reading, Pennsylvania, in January, 1878,
with thirty-three delegates.

The constitution adopted included many of

the traditional demands of organized labor and some new goals.

It called

for the establishment of cooperatives, the reservation of public lands
tor actual settlers and the eight hour work day.

It also demanded

abolition of the contract system for prison labor, the prohibition of

1Phillip Taft, Organized Labor in. American History, Harper & Row, .
Publisher, N.Y., p. 8).
2Foster Rhea Dulles, Labor
p. 129.

!!l America,

Thomas Y. Crowell Co, N.Y••

3
child labor, equal pay for the sexes, the establishment of bureaus
of labor statistics, and by later amendment, government owhership of the
railways and telegraphs, and adoption of a graduated income tax.

1

As

far as industrial action was concerned, the Knights of Labor supported
boycotts, but strongly favored arbitration rather than resorting to
strikes (which they had at first wholly opposed).

The Knights con-

sequently became involved in strikes in spite of themselves, when the
local assemblies were threatened by retaliatory measures on the part
of industry; and when the Knights had no solution regarding the problem
of how arbitration was to be enforced.
Mr. Terence V. Powderly succeeded Mr. Stephens as Grand Ma.star
Worlanan of the Knights.

He had to deal with such innuediate and practical

issues as shorter hours and higher wages--some of the Knights• objectives.
He opposed strikes, believing it a costly remedy to both the employer
and the employees.

Sometimes he had as the Grand Ma.star Workman, a

responsibility in supporting the strikers.

Thus by the Spring of 1886,

the Knights of Labor appeared to have taken control of the entire labor
movement, to be virtually all-powerful.

The public viewed the Knights of

Labor as a closely controlled and disciplined organization that could
I

apparently win any contest against the employer.

•

�

Unfortunately, ·the success of the Knights of Labor did not extend
beyond the year of 1885 when affairs were progressing badly for the
workers.

It was clear that everything had changed and industry quickly

took advantage of every opportunity--it rolled back labor's earlier gains.·

1

Dulles, Op. Cit. p. 132 .

4
The Knights had. indeed. created a solidarity among the workers
that had been but dimly felt before their advent. and they offered
a challenge to the power of industry that revealed as never before
the inherent strength of organization.

1

But whatever merit the

Knights of Labor might possess. it obviously did not answer the need
of the trade unions for a trade union federation divorced from other
2
kinds of labor societies.
So, next one specific trade union shall be discussed--the
steel industry trade union.

1
nuues. Op. Cit.·, p. 148.
2

Taft. Op. Cit., p. 92.
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Period I--Up to 1910
In the early days. trade unions were organizations that protected
the skilled laborer.

Steel industry laborers were no different.

There were three basic trade unions that covered �11 the skilled
metal.ma.king crafts in the mills.

They are the Sons of Vulcan. the

Heaters• and Rollers• Union and Roll Hand's Union.

For the sake of

amity and mutual support during strikes, the three unions joined togather in 1876 to form the Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel
1
Workers.

The main strength of the Association rested in the iron

mills west.of the Alleghenies; in Pittsburgh, for example, both the
Homestead and Jones and Laughlins workers were organized.
The Union suited very well the needs of the industry.

However,

it neglected annual uniform scales for the Western mills, equalized
hours, output, and working conditions.

Consequently. homestead was
One day after

one of the starting points of steel workers' unrest.

the furnaces had all been charged with ingots, all work ceased and
then the workers asked for some demands which ha.d been previously
refused.

Result--the workers got their demands fulfilled.

2

Before the year was over the workmen were asked to withdraw
...

from the Onion and join labor union or be subject to dismissal from
the company's services.

Most of these men were members of the

Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers.
a strike which began January 1, 1882.

The next step was

After the workers ha.d been idle

a week, the Company gave notice that the men could not return to work,

1
Brody, David, Steel Workers in America, TI!! Nonunion�. Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1960, p. 50.
2
Bridge, James Howard, �Inside Histo:r,y 2£
The Aldine Book Company, New York, 1903, p. 1.54.

tho

Carnegie Steel

£2.:.,

6

even if they signed the agreement, unless they would accept a reduction
of wages.

This intensified the bitterness of the workers, and the

Amalgamated Association took cognizance of the dispute.
was carried on throughout the Pittsburgh district.

Also, the strike

The newspapers reported

both sides of the argument: each party in the dispute published daily
columns of protests, accusations, and even threats.

Finally, an appeal

was made by outside interests to the other owners, who, publicly acknow
ledging that they ware powerless, nevertheless interceded between the
employer and the strikers, insisting upon a settlement.
On March 20, 90ace was reached--actually almost a compromise, but
a victory for the men.

A few weeks later, the Amalgamated Association,

.encouraged by its current success, demanded wage increases for all iron
and steel workers throughout the country.
day of this strike.
were employed.

June 1, 1882, was the first

Work was suspended in ali mills where union laborers

The strike continued until September by which time

everyone was tired of it and the workers had even been dropping from the
Amalgamated Association.

The unrest of the workmen in Homestead increased

the discontent of the stockholders and they sold out to the Carnegie
group in October, 1883.
In addition, tension had been mountin� between theJ'ina.nager and
the workman.

In 1889. another strike occurred.

was the main issue.

This time wage increase

The strike was settled and the contract signed

was for a three year period which ended in 1892, in time for the
largest Homestead strike yet.
The wage debate leading to the Homestead strike of 1892 demonstrated
the complexities of the company as it demanded cuts for 325 skilled men.1

1

Brody, Op. Cit., p. 53.
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The company argument depended upon: (1) that some main improve!110nts
in the work increased the output and reduced the work; (2) that the pay
scale had been more than that of their competitors; (3) the company
had invested more money in new machines and they were entitled to some
of the benefits.

The Amalgamated Association, on the other hand, did

not emphasize wages, but did emphasize costs and profits.

It also pointed

out that the company's cost was less than that of its competitors.
Both sides had legitimate arguments, but Carnegie wanted the
Amalgamated Association to liquidate.

Mr.

Carnegie drafted a notice

breaking his connections with the Amalgamated Association because a
"firm cannot run Union and Nonunion, n1 and that no further conferences
should be held with the workmen after June 24, 1892.

On June 23,

at the last conference, neither side was yet willing to yield on any
other points.

The conference bro�e up .and preparations were made for

the struggle.

It is interesting to note that at this time the differences

between the firm and its workmen were truly insignificant. Anotheit
factor was that the general rolling mill scales were also under discussion
and the Amalgamated Association feared that any concessions at Homestead
would weaken it in its contest with the iron mills throughout the country.
Jl

Another item to be mentioned here was the fact th.at of the 3,800 men
employed at Homestead, only 325 were directly affected by the wage cut.
Of the remaining number, which was 3,500, about 3,000 of them did not
belong to the Amalgamated Association and they had already signed a three
year agreement with the company the previous week.

However, they broke

their contracts and joined the dissatisfied workers in their struggle.2

1 Brody, Op. Cit., p. 55.

2Bridge, Op. Cit., p. 209.

8

As it was, the strike continued with the strikers keeping the
owners from lawful possession of the plants.

The manager of the

Homestead requested three hundred guards to forcibly reopen the
plants to non-union men on July 6.

Determined to keep the plant

closed, the strikers organized a military line and virtually took
control of the town.

Forewarned by an elaborate alarm system, they

were prepared when barges attempted to slip into the plants under
the cover of darkness.
a barrage of gunfire.

The detective agents, Pinkerton's,

ware met by

The strike:z,s won only a pyrhic victory as it led

r
to the arrival of the militia and the reopening the works.
But this incident was not the first time that the Carnegie
management requested outside aid.

In the 1889 strike, the company

sent one hundred deputy-sheriffs to take possession of the works.
The strikers disarmed them, shipping them back to Pittsburgh minus
coats and caps.

This strike was ended on November

was out of the Carnegie mills.

17,

and the Union

All attempt of organizing had been

crushed by Carnegie and they threatened to stop work if necessary.
Other steel mills had followed Carnegie in wage cuts, which
was accepted by the Association.

Thus, by 1900, not a steel plant

of consequence in Western Pennsylvania recognized the Association.
By 1903 at Mingo Junction, Ohio, the last of the great steel plants
became nonunion, so that as a result, the Association was limited
to skilled men.

Its strength lay in its control of the supply of

vital steel ma.king skills.

1

Brody,

Op. Cit., p. 59.
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In 1900 some steel industries merged together under the title

of the Steel Industry Corporation.

The Amalgamated Association,

trying to take advantage of this situation started a strike in 1901.
However, it was a failure, and almost the complete downfall of the
Association.

The weakness of the Amalgamated Associ:..·�:_c..:: was manifest.

Handicapped in depressed periods by their contracts, independent firms
found it relatively easy to break With the Association at a time
when many skilled men were unemployed and eager to work.

The Union

lost altogether about thirty lodges and four thousand men in the
1904 recession.
disastrous.

The months after the panic of 1907 were equally

Thus, when prosperity returned in the spring of 1909,

the Amalgamated Association had the strength neither to benefit the
steel corporation nor effectively to oppose it.

1

This era up to 1910 is chara�terized by two points:
1.

The steelmakers could congratulate themselves on the

success of breaking. labor organizations.

Up until 1910, the steel

companies were opposed to any organized labor union.

They tried to

stop the laborers from organizing, believing that a Union was

a

serious obstacle to efficiency.

2.

,..

The Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steelworkers was

mainly a skilled labor union.

Every time there was an attempt to

entice the unskilled workers to join in the organization, it always ended· in failure for the organization.

The fact of the matter

was that most of these unskilled workers were immigrants, and work
to them had different objectives.

1

Brody, Op. Cit., p. 71.
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Immigrants
Until 1900. only English-speaking people immigrated to America.
But. after that date immigrants fr�m South and Eastern Europe began
_
to arrive in increasing numbers.
The structure of the immigration is: (1) most of the immigrants
were peasants,

qr,

inheritance an� tradition; (2) consequently. they

were unskilled steel workers; and (3) they came to America, hoping
1
to earn some money to buy a piece of land at home· and go back.
Comparing wages received in America with those back home, the
immigrants found that the wages in America ware higher and were wellworth immigrating.

The fact of the matter was that such wages were

far below the minimum for family existence, but the immigrant steel
workers, not expecting to support families in America, mainly came
alone and left their families behind.
Working in America was not easy.
and such were glad to work extra days.

Only the hardier men immigrated
Their philosophy was

work all the time, go home and sleep, you do not have to spend,
therefore you save more.

However, a fat pay envelope overshadowed

heavy labor, long working hours, and the consolation that the hard
,
life was only temporary--a few years sacrifice in exchange for
competence at home.

As a result, stability in the unskilled ranks

rested on mobility.

The newcomers either moved up into the skilled

force, or they moved out of the steel industry at the first depression
or with

1

a

·2
satisfactory accumulation.

Brody,

2

Op.

Cit.,_p. 97.

Ibid • • PP• 108-109.
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To the employer, immigrants were the floating supply of
labor.

He did not care about their welfare.

Also, the presence

of immigrants limited the jobs socially appropriate for native
workers.
To the Union, the Amalgamated Association, had formed the
sources of strength in the mill towns.

But also there was no

interest in trade unionism among recent immigrants in steel towns.

12
Period II--1910-1930
Beginning with the ye�r 1914, the labor system for steel
workers had changed.

A

main factor was the world war which pro-

foundly altered the situation for three reasons: (1) because of
the ·labor shortage, immigration slowed down, (2) the demand for
steel increased, and (J) for the first time the federal government
intervened to guarantee the working man's rights to organize.

Mr.

Wilson, Secretary of Labor, said, "I am for the laboring man.

Justice

must be done him or there can be no justice in the country. ul
Wilson's propaganda presented its special appeal to trade unionism.
Worker unrest ha.d been fruitful because steel rren cannot afford
any strike.

To reduce the labor unrest, steel men responded by

increasing wages.

Steel men also thought of other things to over-

come the shortage of labor; and an example was Negro migration from the
South to the North.

This, however, did not work out for a simple

reason that Negroes were not accustomed to hard work.

Another thing

that aggrivated the situation was the drafting of young men.
The Americanization movement was adopted by the steel companies
who could not afford to lose any of their European immigrants.

This

,;

movement involved various aspects: special housing for the immigrant,
welfare projects, increased wages, and aid in becoming American citizens.
In 1917 the government, trying to insure essential output, had
to again intervene to win the workers• support and to prevent further
strikes.

The government assigned labor and management to a War

Labor Conference Board, which later ha.d unanimous agreement upon
set of principles to govern future labor ralations.

1

Brody, Op. Cit.• , p. 20).

Upon its

a

13
reconunendation, the president in April,

1918, approved the National

War Labor Board to serve as a final court of appeal to settle all
industrial disputes that could not be resolved through any other
means.1

This board was composed of five representatives from labor

and five from management.

The National War Labor Board policy was

a reflection of the government's new friendly attitudes toward labor,
which was shown in the labor legislation.

In return,

there were to

be no further strikes or lockouts .for the duration of the war.
When the war was over, the steel manufacturers were thoroughly
alarmed and prepared to fight the spread of unionism.

Employers.

who in many instances had been compelled during wartime to recognize
unions and deal with them, were now anxious to throw off the shackles
imposed by such organizations.
But the grievances of the steelworkers ware:

(1) the mass

dismissals which spread throughout the country, especially between
active union members;
unionize.

(2) the long working hours; and (3) the right to

Union leaders had attempted to approach employers to discuss

with them such grievances, but industry leaders refused to meet with
union leaders.

Then the union leaders appealed to the president, which

was also unsuccessful, 'to get the industry leaders to mJet with them.
The union, calling for a meeting in Pittsburgh on July

20, 1919, to

plan for a strike vote, overwhel!ningly voted for a strike.
So the strike began on Septemb?r

22, 1919.

almost completely shut down in several places.
January

1

5. 1920.

The steel mills were
The strike ended on

But, the popular view of the strike had two

Dulles, Op. Cit • • p.

226.
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fateful consequences: (1) it excluded government intervention and
the public support was totally absent in 1919; and, (2) the result
of the national hysteria enabled the· steel manufacturers to exercise
complete freedom of action during th3 strike.

1

Conversely, the unpopularity of the st�ike, or the failure of
it, could be attributed to sev�ral reasons.

The first was that the

president had urged the union to postpone the strike, to create
another opportunity for industry to change its.position, but the
union refused.
The second reason was the personality of

Mr.

William

z.

Foster,

a member of the Chicago local union of the Brotherhood of Carmen and
later the Secretary of the National Committee for Organizing the
Mr.

Iron and Steel Workers.

Foster had been accused of radical points

of view because he published a pamphlet, in 1911, concerning Lyndicalism
attacking capitalism.

Unfortunately for the union,

Mr.

Foster's

radical p�st was brought up again because he was a key figure in the
strike.

The steel industry leaders had used this information to

demonstrate that the steel strike was a radical conspiracy.
On October 9, of the strike,
,
according to union sources, it was claimed that 367,000 workers
The third reason was strikebreakers.

were out.

However, the companies questioned this figure, insisting

that most of the strikers were unskilled workers who could be easily
replaced.2

Thus, in late October nu.�bers of _Negroes began appearing

in steel centers; the strikers ware convinced that the inexperienced
Negro would do more harm than good in the mills.

1

Brody, Op. Cit.,

2
Taft, Op. Cit.,

PP•
P•

248-249.

357.

15
It is very interesting to mention that the National Committee
noted that the immigrants had proved to be devoted to their obli
gations during the strike.
surrender.

1

In fact, they were the last ones to

Also worth noting is that the skilled steelworkers were

the soft flank in the strikers• ranks, so that some of them had
returned to work before the official end of the strike.
The collapse of the strike was a crucial defeat for the unions.
Nothing now mattered more than the morale of the steel workers, and
lacking as they did in trade union discipline and strike benefits,
no work was available for these active strikers.

The steel companies,

having rooted out the agitators, were eager to restore good feeling.
Wages had increased, and welfare programs were initiated.

The Twenties

witnessed a total reconstruction of the pre-war labor situation.
But, as for the Amalgamated Association, its wartime gains quickly
evaporated in the hostile air of the Twenties.

1Brody, Op. Cit., p. 260.
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Period

III--1930-1945

Up to

1930 the labor policy had functioned upon two premises.

The first was an attempt to prevent the spread of unionism and to destroy
it by the discharging and blacklisting of the active union members.
Al.so included with this was espionage ·within the union and a studied
policy for an efficacious 0mise" of ethnic groups.

The second concern

was to win the loyalty of the employee, through welfare, fringe

1

benefits, and paternalism.

The collapse of the stock market in October

1929, signaled the

beginning of a severe decline in business and employment.

Total gross

product dropped sharply which led to a drastic decline in income, which
in turn resulted in continually increasing unemployment.
study conducted by the AFL in February

A research

2
1928, called attention to the

increasing unemployment among organized wo�kers.
danger sign for union members who, in the

This presented a

1920's were predominately

skilled workers and therefore generally not among the first to be
laid off.

It was not until

1933 that the National Industrial Recovery

Act was passed with its Section 7 (a) guaranteeing workers the right
to organize and bargain through representatives of their own choosing
without interference or coertion by the employers.
Immediately following the depression, there were internal
difficulties within the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel, and
Tin Workers.

These difficulties had been raised by a militant

rank-and-file- movement which had been developing within the steel
centers demanding for an organized union for the steel industry.

1

Robert Livernash, Collective

Bargaini� in the Basic Steel

Industry, U.S. D9pt. of Labor, January,

2

Taft, Op. Cit., p.

411.

19b1,

P:- 5b.
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John

L.

Lewis and his associates of the United ¥..ine Workers of America

believed th·it the fate of Unionism in the Captive Coal lfiners of U .s.
Steel depended in a large part upon a supporting organization in basic
1
steel.

At the convention of the A.F.L.

in

1934,

Mr. Lewis asked the

A.F.L.

to conduct a campaign of organization in the iron and steel industry.
the

1935

cor.venti0n,

the A.F.L. refused to interfere due to the

internal difficulties.

)

of the A.F.L. fund
steelworkers,

In

!fr. Le w is offered

1936,

At

A.F.L.

$500,0002 ( equal to 1/3

as a contribution from the Yd.neworkers to organize

but the

A.F .L.

Hr.

turned dow"'n the offer.

L ewi s

thereupon

began dealing directly with the Amalgamated in the name of the c.r.o.
which was formed in November of

1935.

The Steel Workers Organizing Conurd.ttee

(SWOC)

was formed in

1936.

It was recognized by the corporations as the bargaining agent for its
members.

The SWOC was

not an autonomous,

r.i0mber-controlled union.

It

was influenced by the United Mine workers of America who supplied the
greater·part of its finances and staff,

and the imprint of the miners

was discernable in its early leadership, attitudes,
was a tight control from the top which took the form

and tactics.

of

There

a benevolent

3

autocracy .

The success that SWOC had with the major fi�m was�exemplified
when the U.S. Ste0l,
steel" companies;

desiring a cont�act, was unbalanced by '�ittle

( P..Gpublic,
)

Bethlehem and National .

Youngstown. Sheet and Tube, Inland,

They resisted a signed agreement,

ensuing strikes began in May of

1

Livernash,

2

1938.

Op.

Cit. ,

p.

1937.

74.

Benjamin Stolberg, The Sto�y £!:.the

p.

70.

Jr. ivernash,

Op.

Cit. ,

p.

and

77.

C.I.O.,

Viking Press, N. Y.,
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The organizers believed that the cost of a strike would be less
than the be!1efits of future nonunionization.

However, strike

failed for the following reasons:

1.

SWOC was not yet prepared, ooneywise and experience wise,

to call the strike in a broad front.
2.

The SWOC's members were inexperienced.

).

The strike was during an economic downturn, making it:easier·

for the companies to close the mills.
It was not so much attributable to the failure of Si>JOC with
the 'Little steel" But also to the renewal of the U.S. Steel contracts
in 1938, that public SU'?port of the C.I.O. had weakened the economic
recession and that "Little ste0l" was dote�mi.ned to refuse SWOC
signed agreements until legally raquir0d to do so.

Indeed, it was

not until 1942, and then with gove�nment help and the added stimulus
of wartirns emergencies, that signed agreerr.ants wera achieved .

1942

was the yaar the United Steelworkers of America �s formed to take over
the Amalgamated Association of ��on and Steel �nd become the negotiating
power.

It was the changing attitudes of the industry to accept reality

and endure the situation, as Hr. John

A.

Stephens, Vice-presidant for
,;

industrial relations at U.S. Steel, had said,

0

•

•

•

there is incumbent

on management the responsibility of making the union relationships
as responsible, agreeable, and constructive �s is possible, without
deviation from sound principles or compro�ise with what is right.

It

is, of course, essential that principles not be confused with prejudicies.111

1

Ibid., p. 64.
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Some conditions formulating the events of

1937

1

included one.

wage. because the United States Steel Corporation and so�e other
steel industries were formed by mergers.

Tha wages between the workers

in the same level. having the sama job diff�red and served as the basis
for complaints alleging iniquities.

Also, secondly,

development affecting equipment, reaterials,

neiJ' technological

processes.

products, and

work assie;nment had tended to accumulate wago rat0 dislocations.
Thirdly,

there were the hourly paid jobs, and workers in these jobs

were �.a.king better w1ges than the regular workers.

Fourth,

the

uniform work week lowered the take-horns pay of workers on continuous
operations relative to other departments.
agreel'l'lent was negotiated in

Consequently.

the first

1937 between the U.S. Steel Corporation

and the Steel Workers' Organizing Co:mttee (SwOC).
Grievances had been increasing during the period of

1941

1939-41.

agreement dealt with rate establisbman� and adjustment.

were two points of view--the Union's and the Company.

A

There

The Union's

.main point of view was equal pay for similar work throughout the steel
industry, and its second object was wage equality between plants.
The Company's main regard was to correct intraplant iniquities.
the

Thus

1941 agreemsnt with U.S. Steel recognized that the Company would

use job evaluation and industrial engineering methods in setting rates
for new jobs.

Formerly,

steel wo�kers had accepted job evaluation

and bargained within the framework of specific evaluation programs
on many occasions.

1stiebar,

Jack, �Steel Ind�st�y 1!2.N.e Structll!"e,

!

Studv of

the Joint Union-Management �Evaluation P�ogr� :1:!2 th0 &!.sic Stael

Industry, Harvard University Press,

Kass., 1959. pp. 3-12.
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Then a

1942 agreement contained the p�ovision for arbitration

of grievances over new and changed.jobs.

The

1942 contract provided

for the first joint effort by the Union and U.S. Steel to study and
eliminate wage rate iniquities.

Host of the

1942

:igreements contained

provisions for reopening negotiations upon notice by either pa�ty,
and in the event the parties failed to agree upon proposed changes
within a specified time
would

(20 or

JO

days in most cases), the agreements

be terminated.

Method
Tha board's directive order specified four steps to be followed
by the parties in eliminating iniquities; description of the jobs,
place�znt in proper relationship, reduction of classifications to the
smallest practicable number, and the establishment of wage rates
in accordance with guideposts set forth in the directive order.
The Cooperative
The

Wage

Study (CWS)

1942 U.S. Steel manual reported joint commission negotiations

that were exceedingly complex and could not be understood by most
steel workers.

Some months after the union°s joint commissions

had broken up, several majo� steel companies formed a group to explore
,.
..

the possibilities of a cooperative study of the iniquities problem.
As a result, the CWS was established in Pittsburgh at the end of

1943.

Also a CWS manual was designe<i for production and maintenance jobs in
the steel industry.

An atte�pt w�s mad� toward simplicity so that it

might be understandable to the aver�ge e�?loyee.
The objective of CNS was to C.otermL. ..:; the wage .."::.·..:.� situa tion
::

in the Companies,

determine what it should be, an� determine ways

and means of bringing about such correctic�s when r.ecess�ry.

21

Its �pproach was:

(1)

set a manual cl�s�ifying steel jobs which

(2)

would be applicable to steel industry generally;

discover the

underlying wage structure of the steel industry as a whole; and

(3)

its approach was based upon the assumption that there existed

a general wage structure for the basic steel industry which in
varying degree would reflect job relationships in individual steel
plants and companies; and finally,

(4)

the CWS technicians believed

that designing wage structure was beyond the scope of job eval:ua
tion.

They preferred to discover and utilize the waights for

various job factors which had been developed in the steel industry
through "the impact of the community labor market, the ups and downs
of business cycles, hundreds of thousands of individual judgments
and individual bargaining, as well as collective bargaining."
In order to determine factor weights, all jobs were divided
into three classes:

(2)

(1)

those paid hourly rates with no incentive,

those paid hourly rates considered to be dquita.ble and having

incentive earnings above the hourly .rates and

(3)

jobs paid straight

piece work or tonnage rates and having no guaranteed hourly rate.
The plan itself served four purposes:

(1)

their ranking

,,.
helped to determine the number of factor. levels and the maximum
level needed in each factor to cover the field;

(2)

their class-

ifications and rates were used to determine the final factor weights,

(3)

these jobs were designated 0banchmarks," an integral part of the

plan to be . used in classifying other jobs, and

(4)

bonchwork jobs

served to test the adequacy of the plan _upon its cc�-.:::;>:.CJtion.
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Period IV--1946-1959
In 1946 the Union demanded a wage increase of
Steel was offering 15¢.

18t¢ an hour.

U.S.

An industry-wide strike started January 21,

and was settled February 15, with a resulting

18i¢ wage increase,

which followed the modification of government wage-pric0 policy to
permit an immediate $5.00 a ton increase in steel prices.

The

contract between U.S. Steel and the Union was reopened in April,
1947, and again in June, 1948, and the two settlements were peacefully resulted in small wage increases.
The easy way of negotiating a contract almost every year was
due to the fact that there was shortage of steel workers during this
period.

An additional factor was the increase in the cost of living

which exerted pressure from the members on Union le�ders for wage
increases.
A new contract was achieved in 1950 without a strike.
this time the Korean War was going on.
was established.

Thora was

a

By

A system of economic controls

separation between prices and wages;

price·control was administered by an organization responsible to the
president; wage control was put in the hands of an independent·
tripartite board.

Negotiations with steel companies led by U.S.

Steel and the Union started in November, but made no progress.

It

became evident that the companies wera seeking to do their bargaining not with the Union, but with the government and not over wages
but over prices.

1

1

Grant McConnell, Steel ��d the Presidency, 1962, W.W. Nortan
& Company, Inc. New York; p. 58.
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The Union's demand was wage increase supported by the recom
mendation of the .-.rage Stabilization Board.

However, the industry

rejected the increase der:ianding to ma.intain both prices and wages
or increase prices and wages.
The president, finding himself in a bad position,

decided to

"seizen the steel mills in order to m.e.inte.in production.

But the

matter was taken to the U.S. Supretr.e Court which advised that the
"seizure" was unconstitutional and the mills were retu:-ned.
strike broke out which lasted for

55 days.

increase along with a large price increase.
ments occurred in

A

It ended in a large
Two peaceful settle

1953-1954, through which worke�s received a

substantial wage increase and steel prices were raised substantially.
This time the government did not become a participant in the situa
tion, and it continued on the basis of non-involvement and under
standing between the parties to produce a new era of peace in the
steel industry.
By the end of
on the industry.

1956 the Union presented a set ·of large demands

The industry rejected these and a strike started.

The government did not directly involve itself in the situation,
although the Secretary of Labor and Secretary of the T�aasury
communicated with the parties.

The indust�y then, knowing that

there was a growing �em.and for steel, signed a contract for three
years which was accompanied by a price increase.

Structure of Bar�ainin�
The ba.!'gaining structure which the union was attemptir.� to
gain was industry-!,ri.da bargaining.

U.S .. Steel had been assu:U.ng

the leadership in negotiations and s0ttl0�ents,

and the other

24

companies tended to follow.

U.S. Steel carried the burden of con

flict with the Union over issues of principle to a greater extent
than did the other companies.
Between

1937 and 1941, the Union uas too weak to enforce any

industry-wide bargaining.

The Union was still an organizing committee

with no per1�nent structure and little real influence.

But in

1943

the United Steel Workers of America was established.
Thus,

from

1942-1946, the Union was driving for the goal of

industry-i:vide bargaining as an aid for securing its equal pay for
equal work objective.

Following the

1946 strike through 1954, the

Union achieved some employ:nant through the job.evaluation program.
The industry-wide goal was not accomplished because of some remaining
area of wage differentials and other elements of resistance.
In

1955 the first open and substantial move toward industry

lri.de bargaining was achieved when the Union announced there would
be a negotiating committee, and that all negotiations would be held
in Pittsburgh.

This com:nittee had met twice in

1956 and 1959 with

a four-man industry committee representing twelve companies.
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Period V--1 959-1965
Strike of 1 9 59
Representatives of twelve steel com9anies undertook key negotiations with the United Steelworkers of America.

They proposed,

on April 1 0 , 1959 , that the contr�ct cue to ex-9ire or. June JO, be
extended for an additi·::mal year rNith delati.-m of the provision for
future autom:i.tic cost-of-living adjustment s . 1

But the Union refused

the project, and, on its side , offered a package deal.
parties had met but no prograss was achieved, and
seemed i�.rninent.

a

The two

strike on July 1 ,

Howeve r , the p�asident of the United States then

intervened by requesting that the parties continue to bargain without
interruption of production until a settlement was achieved.

Still

no progress was made and the strike started July 15.
The companies' position was that they could not afford a wage
increase without a product increase , in other words--a price increase in steel industry.

The companies stated that their ability

to pay wage and other payment increases was 2% a year.
This dispute had occurred during a period of growing national
interest in ways of achieving both price stability and e conomic
growth.

Such public interest had put unusual strain on collective

bargaining, more than in previous year s , it had been widely felt
that the settlement in steel would affect wages and prices through
out the country. 2

1

Report of the President , the 1959 L.1bor Dispute in the Steel
Industry, Submitted by the board of inquiry under executive order
10843 and 10848, October 1959, p. 1.
2

Report of the President, Op. Cit . , p. 3.
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Three incidents happened during the

1)

strike .

They were :

The strike was the longest strike in the history of the

Steel industry--it lasted
2)

1959

116

d�ys .

The strike could have lasted longer had the president

of the United States not interfered.

On October 20, he demanded

an injunction, based on the national emergency provisions of the
Ll1RA ,

requiring the steelworkers to return to their jobs for a

period of eighty days .

After court procedure s , during an appeal

by the Union, the injunction went into effect on November
which time the U . S . Suprama Court decidE>d that the

7,

116-day

at

"strike

impe rils the nati onal safety . ul

3)

A joint Human Relations Research Coru:uttee was established

to study and recommend solutions to mutual problems relating to
equitable wage and benefit adjustments , job classification, incentive pay, protection of long-servic0 employees against lay-offs ,
medical care , and other problems. 2
The Kaiser Plan
During the strike of
mendous losses.

1 959,

Kaiser Steel had suffered tra7

Kaiser Steel was looking for solutions;
thus they
..>

sat down with the steelworkers to decide the details of the settleThe basic concept was to develop a plan which would provide

ment.

a systematic means of resolving the basic distribution of the benefits of ec onomic progres s , thus eliminating th� periodic contract
expirations and strike deadlines related to these ec onomic issue s .

1

W�ge Ch�onology , United St�tos Stec� Corporation, 1937-67,
BU:..��tin if160J , July 1 9 6.8 , U . S . ��r�xc�� of L�bor, p . 24.
2
Ibid. , P• 2 6 .
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In doing this, they came U?

L
II.
I.

...-ith two very inter-related aspects:

,

The Long Range Cor.imittee
The Long Range Sha.ring Plan

1'he Lorn;; Ranl?je Commit tee
This committee was established on October

26, 1-159.

composed of nine membe rs , reprasenting three partie s :
the Company, and the public.
each party.

It was

the Union,

There were three representatives from

The purpose of the c ommittee was to provide a vehicle

for the development of a long-range economic prog�am,

specifically : 1

1.

Promote stability of employment.

2.

Safeguard employees ag&inst increa ses in the cost of living.

3.

Provide for equitable sharing of incrGased p�oductivity .

4.

Encourage the necessary eApansion of the c ompany .

The areas of its studies were pinpointed.
1.
2.

3.

2

Past experience and problems with technological change .
· An evaluation of the O?oration of the grievance procedure.
Possible wider communication of sales anci production

plans to employee s .

4.

The advance dissemination to employees of information

concerning plans for moderni zation, �uto�.ation, and expansion.

5.

A review of present incentives in the light of forth-

coming technological changes in the industry.

6.

The development of procedures which will operate to pre-

vent strikers.
7.

The developmant of a �ea�s of shortening the benefits of

econo:nic progre s s , including provisions for displaced employaes.

1

Gerald E . Balsley, The Knisor Ste0l--United Steelma!-:ers of

?
�• •
America, Long Ranges Sharing Plan, IR

2Ibid . ,

p.

51.

Boston

1 963, p . 50.
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II .

The Long Ra.n�e Sharing_��an
Because Kaiser was a relatively newcomer , they tried to have the

new plans to encompass two main problems.

The first was that of

tho existing inequities between the employees .

The second problem

was the long range one of providing equitable futuro distribution of
gains .
The committee worked on the plan, drew up the final draft and
explained it to the employees.

They voted on it.

The result was

three to one and the plan was put into effect on March 1 , 1963.
The plan gas to protect workers against job losses due to technical
displacement and offered them one-third of any direct production
saving.

During the first ten months the plan was in effect , labor

and material costs had been reduced by more than $9 million.
�orkers received $3 million under the new plan for an average of
46¢ an hour.
1962 Agreement
The memory of the 1 959 strike, which had lasted for threa
months, had euraged the new Damocratic administration elected i n
1960 t o call the 1 1 companies and the Steelworkers i n for early
negotiation of the contract ending July 1962.

Formal talks started

February 14.
The Union noted that the companies had made money "even when
productivity fell balow 50% of capacity, ��1 due to an increasing
demand.

But , the companies noted that emplo�ent costs had risen

12� over the previous three years p while productivity was up only
6.Jf
/:> •

The Union was dernar.din� 1 6¢ per hour, and the companies were
1

George J . JcHar.e. s , The Inside Sto::-v of Steel (.J:.ges and Prices
1959-1967, Chilton Book Co . , Philadelphia,p. 36.
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only offerJr":� 8¢.

On March 31, after one or two breakdor,ms in ne-

gotiations, a settlement was announced.

The formal contract had

a nominal length of two years, but the Union could bargain and
strike for practically anythin� after one year.

The package was

valued at 10¢ an hour for one year. 1
The government played a big role in bringing the two parties'
points of view together by returning them to the bargaining ta:ble .
each time discussion had ceased.

It had been said the govern.�2nt

never said "no" to wage increase and always said 0no" to price
increases.
The 1963 settlem3nt was a peaceful one.

The Huwzn Relations

meetings had begun after the 1962 settlement.

Its philosophy was

that both sides were free to reverse themselves en any point;
bargainers were free to explore without being committed.

That

philosophy had aided in resolving the problems of the pressures of
contract' deadline , and the negotiations went very well.

There was

also an appeal from the President to the Steel Union to 0conduct
itself in accord with its long-range interest, which is the national
interest, price stability is the best thing for the steel industry
and wage stability is the best thing for the steel union, 11

2

The official announcement of the contract came on June 20,
1963 (the c ontract costing 15¢ over 21 months ) .

Also the idea ·

had been introduced of sabbatical leaves for workers on trips.
and increasing vacations .

The underlying idsa was that tha Union

thought that be reducing the hours of work by the year, this would
create additional job opportunities .
1
Ibid. , P • 39 .
2
HcMa.nus , Op. Cit . , p. 86.

30

1 965 Contract
The year 1965 h�d witnessed
ers. so a Union election

was

a

split between the Union ° s lead-

h0ld o:n Fob:ru.a.:.ry 9 .

Never had there

been a case involving a national election of a Union as big as the
Steelworkers.

Hhen one side claimed an election victory. the other

vowed to carry their battle t�rough to the bitte r 0nd.

The com-

par�es did not even attempt negotiations with a divided Union.
negotiations ceased.

All

A conflict a�fected by this concerned two

can companies--the American Can Co. and the Continental Can Co.
Howeve r . negotiations were resumed on February 2 3 .

The companies

offered a three year package with a 16¢ wage increase, more SUB
and new pension benefits.

The Union demand for 24¢ in wage plus and

new plans for SUB and pensions had �en refused by the companies.

On

March 1 , a steelworkers0 st:.'ike 0rupted in the can companies,

but on March 22, agreement was reached.
forty months .

The new contract was for

The increase in wages was 26¢.1

Pensions were hiked

from $) .25 a month to $5.50 a month fer each year of service .

SUB

duration was increased to five yea�s for 1 0-year men and two years for
5-year men.

The cost of the package was esti�Ated at 45.7¢ by the Union.

Other negotiations · involved tee basic steel industry=.

On

1"1.arch 9 ,

the talks ware resumed . and a week later the union presented a
list on non-economic dew.ands.

The demands called for the stream-

lining of grievanco procedure s and measures to deal with grievance
backlogs, among other thing s .

After another waek, the Union pre-

sentod a second set of demsnds, this time econ�rnic on.-) s .
included two general

1

wage

These

increases of 1 2 . 5¢ an hou�, an added

Mc!-1.anus, Op. Cit . , p . 148.
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10� for all jobs not covered by inccntive s 0 cost-of-living adjustments ,
and

a

guarc::. ntee that

of their old psy.

rr.en

transferred to lo-.vc:.. jobs would receive 9 5�

It also included six new pension provisions

and four SUB de!':lands . 1
While it was true tha t there was a split in the Union, one thing
for certain was that negotiations

with

the basic steel industr.v had pulled

the Union effort tog0ther to assure so�e degree of bargaining unity.
The deadline for a strike was ¥i.ay 1 .

The companies, · on Aoril

1 5 , proposed an open-end extension to run &t least 60 days after
Vi.a.y 1 , but the Union said 0no. 0

A

fow days later the Union me.de

new offers to rr.eet with the governmsnt guideline of ) . 2% .
panies refused it.

Reaching no agreen:�nt,

Policy Com...inittee authorized a strike .

The cc�-

the Steelworkers Wage

After s o!T.e talk, the strike

deadline was extended four months--ur.til Septemoor, and the Union
had to serve notice by August 1 , if it wanted to go out Septembar 1 .
Although steelworkers in the local a.rea did not like the new arrange,

ment, they agreed that
fall.

spring

was the best tima to strike , not the

The local co�pany had negotiated a contract with local Union

officials and international representatives , but Union msmbers
voted against the ag:r0em0�t and w0nt on strike .
At this same ti."':le , steelworkers
num companies , represented by Alcoa.

wQ..-.a

nogotiating with the alumi-

In d�awing up that contract,

the Union negotiating group was divided--with one side accepting
the companies• offers, and the other ba�gaining for more b3nefits .
The strike deadlir.e wc.. s

June

1 , but on M:ly 31 , an agreG!nent ·was

reached and the new contl'"act with c.lu.":'linum c ompanies was signed for
three years.

The full contract was p�iced at about 50¢ over the

Ibid . , p . 1 50 .
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One of the factors that affected the negotiations of 1965 was the
split between the Union° s l::iaders.
United Steelworkers of

America ,

David

J.

1-:cDon�ld, the president of

was challenged by I.S. Ab3l. secretary
Pl"esidential elections were held in 1965

treasurer of the steelworkers .

and it was quickly apparent that Abel had strong backing fror.i within
the organi zation.
The opposition to M�. McDonald was based upon: ( 1 ) the centralized
power at the command of

Mr.

McDonald and his staff and the rank and file

was not heard from at any r.egotiations ; ( 2 ) He was charged with being too
friendly with management and his approach had eliminated elected officers
from the bargaining.
becoming a science.

This had affected bargaining, which was rapidly
Also.

the

Hum.an Relations programs intended to

elevate technical specialists and staff people did baco�e more important .
( 3 ) It was

also

charged that the negotiations of 1 962 and 1963 were in

ferior because local conditions did not i�prove ; steel pay was lagging. 1
( 4)

A

final item against

Mr .

McDori.ald concerned his personal life .

Since he traveled ( first class ) , played golf, kept �
and frequented nightclubs ,
back on

many

Palm

Springs home

workers felt that he had turned his

them.

Tho Pattern of Collective B:lrgaining: 1959-1965
Collective bargaining in basic steel industry had been highly praised
for its peaceful settlerr.ents in 1 962 and 1963.

A

strike si:nilar to that

of 1959 had been avoided, and friendly talks resulted.
The Unions and
the 1959 strike .

the

steel industry h�d both learned a lesson from

They had assu_�ed that in

mittee the demand for steel w�s inelastic.
temporary

halt of production. would

1Ibid . , p . 142.

net

the

Hu.man Rel�tion Com

Ttus a strik0 , even a

affect the demand.

To their

surprise , as
irr business

a

result of the 1959 st�ike , they d�scoversd that the

rr�y

have exceeded the i�.::lediate loss in p�oc�ction because of
�

stri'.<e-induced changes in custorra.ry buying habits . ...

The loss in b'J.sin� ss

was due to the change to competini �.aterials and to i�ports .
in

not a loss in business, but also
The

Hmnan

loss

work

It was

opportunitie s .

Relations Com.rnit·::.ce had bc0n utiliz0d to avoid not

only strike s , but customer anticipation

cf

strike s .

It worked

satisfactorily in the two settlements of 1962 and 1963.

To achieve

this result, other things wera igno�ed. in tl:e negotiations of tho
new contracts; such items a s seniority role s , creatio� of an in"<:.erplant jobs opportunities program, and
Tho Hurr�n Relations

so

forth.

Committee w&s headed by the two

negotiators of the companies and the U�ion.

?o make

the

chief

1962 and 1 963

negotiations peac.aful , they deleted the second rank of international
union leadership , as well as the local union leadership, from the
negotietion process, appearing to e::Jha�ce the role of the "technicians"
who worked under the coil'.mittee.

That was c0 :tain2.y one factor that

helped to defeat the Union leader

in

the re-election of 1965.

Afte.r chc.nging Union leadors in :.. 965, the P.umc.n Relations Cow..rriittee
was replaced by what they called th0 Hurr�n Relations Ru2.es . 2

These

apply to the entire party to raise any issue, whether or not previously
raised, in any arbitration which would result in failure to reach
agreement.

1

David E . Foller, Proceedings of t�e 21 st An.�ual �inter Mseting
IRRA, Chicago, DJcember , 1968, p . 156.
2Ibid . , p. 157.
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Conclusion to the First Part
In su"Tl!Tlary , the Union took more than fifty years to acc omplish
the goal of uniformity and nationwide bargaining.
positions of the parties were precise .

Until

1955,

the

That i s , the Union favored in

dustrial bargaining, and the industrial opposition preferred to negotiate
on a company-to-c ompany basis.

The companies had prev0nted any efforts

of the Union to accomplish its g�l be dis�issing and Blacklisting Union
membe rs, espionaee, and cutting all roots between the worke r s and the
Union.

Although the co�panies had tried to win the workers ove r to

their side by raising wages and i.�proving working conditions, the
workers continued to harbor animosity and hostility which resulted from
their lack of unioni zed b9.rgaining power.

The Union was , and still i s ,

a sign of power t o the worke r which counteracted the power o f the
management who was exploiting them.
The popularity of the union was moving in the same direction as
that of the business cycle.

When the cycle was at its peak, the manage

ment could not afford to fight the workers because they were needed.
However , when the cycle began to fall , the union was forced to liquidate,
for now the management could retract the benefits which had been previously
given to the worker .
Since

1 91 7 ,

·the government, i n a n attempt t o secure the sup-

port of the workers, had encouraged them to form a Union of their
choice .

But it was not until

1933

that the law finally passed, and

even the n the man�gement did not accept the idea of unionism.

Within

the next nine year s , the management came. to raalize that they had to
tolerate the existence of unions.

Then in

1942,

it had been said that the

U . S . Steel Company aided Philip Murray in establishing the United
Steelworke rs of America.
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As time p!l.ssed, the govzrnmcnt becam0 more involved in the
dispute between the U .S.�.A. and t�e companies.
disputes occurred in
Ken.'led.y, and Johnson ,

1959, 1962,

and

1965

Three such major

in which Eisenhowe r ,

respectively , were deeply involved.

After the steel workers rGach the::.r goal, what i s next?
does collective bargaining really work?
ment?

How

Does -wage affect employ

If wages rise, does that mean employment increases also?

Answers to these questions comprise the topic of the next thesis.
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Introduction to the Sec ond Part

·rhis part of the paper deals ""ith the wa�e theory and the
factors which affect the labor wage s .
dynamic i:nplications .

·11age setting results from

For example . the presence of relatively

higher w�ges among unionized frims in an industry might truly reflect
greater bargaining pressure applied by these firms •

.

than the market

wage pressures among the unorgani zed firrns ; however. higher wage firms ·
might be more susce ptible to organization than lower wage firms s o
that the organization o f the high wage firms might have reflected
favorable market conditions for organization.
The problem is complex.

There is no single answer to it .

There is more than one factor involved.

It i s hard to show how

much one factor may acc omplish apart from. and perhaps in opposition
to.

the othe r .

These factors are:

and government intervention.

wage behavior. market structure

The empirical study tries to corrollata

the se factors together in an attempt to learn what is the most signi
ficant factor in determing wageS in a particular period of time in
the steel industry.
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Wap;e Behavior
Th� wage behavior depends on the interaction between demand
and the characteristics of the waf,e--setting institutions through
which changes in aggregate demand are transmitted.
The traditional concept of a purely competitive labor market
visualized wages as the result of market forces tending to bring
about an equilibrium of the demand and supply at the c ompetitive
That wage rate, acc ording to this competitive market approach,

wa ge.

i s the norm from which deviations occur, a temporary situation; and
equilibrium should be restored again.

The traditional concept of

perfect competition is explained under the as sumption of full
employment.
In practice , perfect competition does not exist, especially
�'laf;es tend to be inelastic in the do"Vmward

not i n the labor market .

direction; in otherwords , wages are not sensitive to demand and supply
condition, and do not sto':') rising when there is unemployme nt.
The demand for any par-ticula:c typo of labor i s de rived from the
demand for its product which depends on the tastes and purcha sing

Also, the nature of tho derived demand for

power of the consumers.

labor depends on the technical c'.'.>ndition of production.

From this

statement we can come up with four variables correlated with wage
changes in the industry :

1

A.

Changes in employment

B.

Average profit level

C.

Industrial Concentration

D.

Unionization

1

\rfage Behavior in the Postwar Period.

An Emoerical
Analvsi s ; Industrial Rel�tions Section . Princeton University. � . J . , p. 65 .
William

G.

Bmven,
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A.

Chan�e s

?-..!!....�:nn lo.'{!'.le nt

William Bowe n ,

in his empirical study of �v:l.ge behavior in the

postwar period came up with these conclusions :
A.

1

The relationship between the level of unemployment and

money wage increase is thr.1.t wages risa

faster when unempl oyment is

relatively low rather than when unemployment i s relatively high.
B.

There i s n o way o f measuring how :nuch unemplo,yment will be

enough to keep wa�es from increasing.

C.

Wage behavior i s influenced not only by the level of un

employm&nt but also by the direction in which unemployment rates are
moving .

At a given average level of unemployment . wages rise much

less rapidly when unemployme nt i s increa ,;ing than when unemployment
i s decreasini;.

D.

in

The fact that wagas are respor.sive to significant variations

the level of unemployment and to steady increase in the level of

unemployment does

B.

not

Average Profit

mean, howeve r , that wages fall readily.

L�

There is a relationship between profits and wage increases.

The

explanation of this is that high-profit firms are more likely to grant
large wage increases than low-profit firms .
There is a strong relationship between profit and wage s , wages and
unioni zation, and wage s and concentration.

However , there is also a

relationship between profits and unionization and profit and concentration
so the cause is not clear.

1Ibid . , p .

85 .

L�O
C.

Industrial Concentration
The more highly concentrated industries have produced the largest

wage increases because of the

strong

interdopendance between tho

degree of industrial concentr�tion and the average level of �rofits ,
and because of the widely recognized tendency for high industrial
concentration and a high degree of unionization to go together .
D.

Unionization
There is no s imple relationship between unionization and wage incraases1

unless it is directly joined with

wage

concentration and profitability.

.

At any rate, unions seem to have more of a positive effect on industry
w1ges in low unemployment periods than in rece ssions. 2
wage increase

a

The amount of

Union demands and succeeds in obtaining is itself a function

of the employer' s demand for labor, his profit position, and his ability
to pass on high wages in the form of higher prices .
It is true that a high degree of industrial concentration and
a high degree of unionization tend to occur together in :nany industries
just as low concentration and low unionization tend to characterize
other industrie s .
Market Structure
The rate of rising prices or increase wages depends really on
the market structure of both the goods and labor.

There are four

types of combinations between the two markets.
1 ) Both markets are competitive, 2 ) Competitive product market
and monoposonistic labor market, J) }1onopolistic product market and
1

Ibid. , p . 72.

2
Ibid. , p . 91 .
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competitive labor ��rke t ; and

4)

monopolistic product market and

monoposonistic labor market.
Unions have becoroo powerful · organizati ons by organizing all
workers within its

jurisdiction.

A Union attempts to gain monopoly

control ove r the labor supply of that trade or industry.

So,

if the

union is controlling the labor market supply , we have one of t�o
cases ;

either monopolistic or co�petitive produc t market.

In the

case of steel industry , it is obvious that the product ma rket is a
monopolistic one.
It has been argued that United Steelworkers of America im?oses
the terms of a key bargain unifor:nly on all the many and varied
firms with which it bargains ,
size, location,

regardless of industrial classification,

competitive circumstanc e s ,

or financial conditions.

Those conditions make the union a monopoly.

So�e pe ople also

oppose the Union-wide bargaining because it cannot take into consideration the local �roblem, the working conditions, and little problems
related to local firms.

Mr. George Seltzer made an empirical study in the basic steel
industry between

1946-1950

1

to prove whe the r or not the United

Steelworkers of America are a n1abor monopoly. 0

He found out that

United Steelworkers of Ame rica do not seem to support the charge ,
for the following reasons:

1.

The application of the key bargain in basic steel is most

effective in the integrated units ,

1

George Seltze r ,

where it serves almost as a rule ,

"Pattern .Bargaining and the United Steelworkers , "

The Journal of Political Econ�mv.

August

1951 ;

p.

320.
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and least effective in the nonintagrated units , where it servos as
a goal.

2.

The immediate e ffectiver.ess of tho key bargain outside the

integrated units decreased duri�g the period studied.
).

The key bargain is most effective with respect to the

amount of wa�e increase and less effective with respect to fringe
items and minimum wag� levels .
Wage uniformity within the basic st�el industry i s produced by
at least three types of forces :

labor and product market conditions ,

government action, and collective bargaining.

So the 1947 and 1 948

settleinents continued the trend toward the equalization between
firms of minimum rates but reversed the trend toward the equalization
of average wage levels.

One force alone cannot affect the wage

uniformity.

Government Intervention
The government may intervene with one or more of the following
objective s :

1

( 1 ) To avert or stop a strike if it threatens

a national

emergency; ( 2 ) To aid in the process of bargaining and facilitate a
settlement; and ( 3) To encourage terms of settlement believed to be
more in accord with the public interest than a privately negotiated
settlement.
In the case of the steel industry, history showed the government
had not intervened until recently, since 1935, tho government has
intervened or exerted influence , in all of the major steel strikes
to achieve one or more of these objectives .

1

Livernash, Op. Cit. , p . 9 .
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·rhe government intervention plays a role in noe;otiations .

It

can take one of two forms , the traditional form of proposing terms
of sattlemont or what they call it high-level mediati on, its purpose
is to move each party from fix0d positions .

The government can

use its power for ec onomic or political reaso�s.

Ex.am9le :

For

economic reasons , the government can influence a wage settlement
in order to stabilize wages and prices to meet with the economic
framework of the whole country·, and to control inflation.
For political reasons, when wartime demands for steel are great
and a steel strike occurs, the g.ovarnment intervenes in the negotiations
on behalf of national defense .
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Summary of the Second Pnrt
In this part of the paper, it has been explained that wages are
not set in automatic response to supply and demand forces of labor
market.

There are several factors th.:1t affect the labor market .

These factors are:

wage behavior, market structure , and govern:nent

intervention.
Wage behavior depends on at least four factors :

changes in

employment, average profit level, industrial concentration, and union
ization.

It cannot be claimed that one of these four factors has

more power than the other , or if other things are constant, can
change the wage behavior.

It cannot be decided how much unemploy

ment would be enough to keep wa�es fro::n increasing or how much profit
helps the increase.

Also, wherever there i s industrial concentration,

there is unionization, too.
Market structure is not only the market for the product, but
also the market for labor.

It rr�kes a differance in negotiations

to know if the labor market is competitive or a monopoly.
from the point of view of the industry.

That is

Also, it makes a difference

from the point of view of the labor negotiator to know if the product
market is competitive or a monopoly.

The industry might be more

lenient in acceptine wage increases if it knows that the labor
market is a monopoly than if it knows that it i s a cnmpetitive .
On the other hand , if laborers know that they nogotiate with

a

competitive indust�y, chancos for wage increases are very slim
unless this particular fir�• s workers are underpaid, except if the
other competitive firms increasa wages of its workers .
a monopolistic industry the story is different.

But, if it is

Governmont intervention has b·:en o. source of conflict.
aopears to

be

It

mor� resented by the industry than the Union.

Tho innustry has objected that intervention h;�s more often com
promised the industry 9osition.

Eo'."ever ,

the Union in

1959

felt

that the injunction considerabl,V favored the companie s .
It should be menti oned

here

that up to

1962

the government

used to send a mediator to attend the nagotiations to prevent the
situation from getting out of hand.

In

1962.

the governTient inacted a

new way of intervention, the wage-price guidepost, which recommended
wa ge increases not more than the percentage increase in the national rate
of productivity growth.

1967.

The guideposts were in practice until

That did not �top the government fro� using the formal

method during this period.
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THE PROBL�M

The traditional wage theory is based on the "!Tlarket mechani sm:
Such

wages depend on the ma rket supply and demand fo� labor.

analytical framework i s appropriate for explaining wage determinati on
unde r simple , commodity-like conditions of employrrient.

Unemployment

i s either frictional , or it arises from rieid money wage .
Following the traditional theory, A . l'1. Phillips came up with
new hypothe sis to be applied at the macro level; th�t i s , the rate
of chan�e of money wage rates can be explainod by the level of
. . unempl oyment.

The rate of change of wai:;es will be approximately

proportional to the excess demand for labor.
empirically determined.

His curve is

It relates wages change , the dependent

variable , to the unemployment level, the independent variable .
Sharp change s in wages take place for a given unemployment
change when unemployment is low, smaller wage changes occur when
unemployment levels are higher.

This paper is an attempt to apply Phillip' s curve in the basic·
steel industry .

The basic steel industry was chosen for the follow

ing reasons :

1.

Because this industry is highly unionized, meaning that

wages are determined by negotiation and not by the free forces
of the · marke t .
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2.

Because the government has increased its intervantion in

the disputes of the steel industry ,

for steel has strategic importance

as a basic component in defense mechanisms.
The hypothe sis is thi s :

The percenta�e chanv,e of wages i s

a function of the percentage change i n the rate o f unemployme nt,
plus the rate of unemployment, plus the percentage change in the
imports of steel, plus the governme nt inte rve ntion,

plus the effect

of the unions .
From a statistical point of view, a major difficulty in
evaluating the effect of unions on wages is the measurement of
the unionism variable .

Another difficulty is the measurement of

government intervention.

fu a
The dependent variable i s the percentage change in wages .
It is

For this figure , the average weekly earning figure is used.

arrived at by multiplying average weekly hours by average hourly
ea rning s .

T o get the quarterly average weekly earnings figure ,

the three months average weekly earnings are added together and
then divided by three .

The percentage change in wages in calculated

from the difference between two consecutive quarte rs .
Therefore . weekly earnings are affected not only by changes
in the length of the workwee k , but also by part-time work,

stop

pages for varying causes , labor turnove r , and absenteeism.
The average weekly earnings are chosen because they include
the hourly wage which i s negotiated by the uni on contract times the
hours .

Also,

they include overtime which i s positively correllated

with output and employme nt.

This bias i s favorable to observing

a negative correllation between wage change and unemployment.
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The rate of separation is used fol.. the rate of unemployment because the latter figure could not be found for the industry.
Separations aro termin�tions of employment during the calendar month
and are classified acc ording to cause :
causes .

quits, layoffs , and other

The quarter rate of separation is the avera1';e of the

three months separation.
Imports are used as an independent variable because the
imports of the steel have increased since 1959.

The figure used

is a percentage of im;iorts fro:n the apparent supply , the apparent
supply is the domestic shipments excluding exports , plus imports.
The effect of the uni on on wage change appears in the years
of the contract negotiation.

To measure its effect, a dummy

variable is used with a value of one to represent the quarter of nego
tiation and a value of zero for the rest of the quarters .

Wage changes

are expected to be higher in the yea r of negotiation.
The government effect on wage change can be tested, using
w1ge-price guidepost which has been in effect fro� 1962 up to 1967.
The wage-price guidepost is simply a wage increase , uniform throughout
industry by a percentage equal to the national trend-rate of productivity

( output

per man hour) growth.

1

A du:mny variable is used for the years

that the wage-price guideposts were in effect.
The years used for this data are 1958-1968, mainly eleven years
divided into four quarters .

These years were chosen because the separation

rates ·are not available before 1958.
This means that

1

we

The first year has three quarte rs.

have forty-three ·observations .

Perolman, Labor Theory, John wiley & Sons , Inc.

New York, 1969, p . 224.
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Sources :
Wage rate and separation rate are from "Employment and Earnings
Stati stics for the

U .S . 0

Import figure s charting stee l ' s progress i s from "American Iron
and Steel Institute . u

Empi rical Finding
The period of study ranges from
the guideposts were in effect from

1958

1968.

1962-1967.

negotiated during the period of study.
of the period of the guidepost;

to

Nithin this period,

There were five contracts

Two ·of the contracts were out

one was in

1959,

the othe r was in

1968.

Table II contains the results of the basic steel industry' s
multiple regression analysis for one dependent variable , the percentage
.
change of average weekly earning.

The empi rical finding shows that

the variables are not statistically significant except for variable
number

4

which ·represents the �uideposts.

variable with at-value exceeding
per cent level.

2,

It i s the only significant

and being significant at the five

!

51

TABL� II

Var .

Q.Q.r-- ff.

1

0.01 1 2

2

-0.0612

'3

-0. 0929

4

-1 . 4544

5

-0.562'3

I
I
'

Std . D�v . Cor-ff.
0 . 008?.
··-

0. 2600
I

I

I
I

T Value

I

I

1 .'372'3

-0.2411

0.0814

-1/1415

0 . 6120

- 2 .?,292

o. 7584

-0 .7415

RESULT
The Phillips hypothesis indicates that wage change is a function
of unemployment.

Wage change does not depend on th� marke't forces;

but it depends on otha� factors, or.e of which is governrnent intervention.

The above result shows that the guideposts wera most in-

fluential factors during this period of time.

The results are c onsistent

with the hypothesis that market forces are not influential in steel
industry.

The gove rnment intervention importance is supported b� ,

the hypothesis . while the union' s importance is not supported.

It

is possible that since the time period was short, the powor of the union
was not evidenced.

One positive factor is that the government had used

the guideposts t o · exert more influence on w�gos in order to keep them
from rising higher than the n�tional trend-rate of productivity growth.
This result does not bare out Phillips hypothesis for steel
industry.
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Re-SUMm8.r.y

The union took more than fifty years to accomplish the goal
of uniformity and nationwide bargaining .

Until

1955,

the positions

of the partie s were precise ; that i s . the union favored industry
wide bargaining, and the companies preferred to negotiate on company
by company basis.
Since

1917,

the government, in an attempt to secure the support

of the worke r s , has encouraged them to form a union of their choice .
However it was not until

1935

that an effective law finally passed.

As time passed, the government became more involved in the dispute
between the United Steelworker of America .and the companies .
such major disputes occured in

1959. 1962,

and

1965

in which Eisenhower ,

Kennedy, and Johns on, respectively , were deeply involved .
ment intervention can take one of three forms :

Three

The govern

a form of proposing

terms of settlement, mediation, and finally a new form which i s the
guideposts.

The wage-price guideposts are simply a wage increases,

uniform throughout . industry by a percentage equal to the national
trend-rate of productivity growth .
between

The guideposts were in effect

1962-1967.

The empiric�l finding shows that the guideposts are the only
significant factor affecting wage changes during the period of study

( 1958-1968) .

Unionism and the rate ot unemployment have no significant

effect on wage changes.
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